So far this year, gerrymandering has been one of the dominant stories, as both sides do everything within their power to secure more of their party’s members in Congress in the midterms.
I already have written about the Virginia election that enabled the state Legislature to draw new voting districts, but since writing that article, a Virginia judge has halted it. Then just last week the U.S. Supreme Court made a ground-breaking ruling about racial gerrymandering in the case of Louisiana v. Callais. While many have been critical of the 6-3 decision based on party lines, this decision did not come out of nowhere; in fact, it is based on years of legal precedent that started a fight between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.
Before the 1960s, the federal government did not concern itself with voting districts. Voting was a state issue, and gerrymandering was as old as the nation itself. The practice was named after the eighth Massachusetts governor, Elbridge Gerry, a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, who redrew districts in his state to benefit his party.
However, in 1962, the liberal Warren Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that federal courts could hear challenges to unequal legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, in 1964, the same Court created the “one person, one vote” rule in Reynolds v. Sims, which emphasized that representation must be based on people — not geography — requiring states to redraw districts regularly to reflect population changes. With these decisions, the Court opened the door of judicial oversight, and the government walked right through.
In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. The important part of the Act for this story is Section 2, which prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race or color. Over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 to play a central role in redistricting, particularly in cases involving claims of vote dilution. In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Court required the creation of majority-minority districts, which are electoral districts where racial or ethnic minority groups make up more than 50% of the population. Its purpose was to give those groups a fair opportunity to elect representatives.
The issue that arose, as seen in Louisiana v. Callais, is the contradiction between Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both are designed to promote equality in the democratic process, they often pull states in opposite directions when drawing legislative and congressional districts. The Fourteenth Amendment embodies the principle of equal treatment under the law and has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to discourage decision-making based on race. In contrast, Section 2 sometimes requires states to consider race in order to prevent minority vote dilution.
Those critical of Louisiana v. Callais claim it destroys the spirit of Section 2. Its purpose is to guarantee minority voters have an equal chance to have their voices heard in the political process. This idea has been supported in Thornburg v. Gingles. It was also reaffirmed in Allen v. Milligan (2023). Alabama’s 2020 census showed the Black population growing, but the new voting district map still only had one Black voting district. Civil rights groups sued, and the Court agreed, requiring Alabama to create a second Black voting district.
Alabama’s argument in Allen v. Milligan was that Section 2 goes against the Equal Protection Clause, requiring states to treat individuals equally and avoid racial classifications. This, too, has legal weight behind it. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Supreme Court held that districts drawn predominantly based on race, especially those that are unusually shaped and disregard traditional districting principles, may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court was concerned that such districts reinforce racial stereotypes and suggest that voters should be grouped primarily by race. In Miller v. Johnson (1995), the Court held that race should not be the “predominant factor” in drawing district lines. Together, these cases established that while race may be considered, it cannot be the overriding factor guiding redistricting decisions.
So, in Louisiana v. Callais, the Court’s goal was to address the tension between Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause by reinforcing a middle-ground approach. States may consider race when there is strong evidence that doing so is necessary to prevent minority vote dilution, but race cannot be the predominant factor overriding traditional redistricting principles. In other words, the case did not eliminate the conflict between the two, but clarified that compliance with Section 2 is justified only if it is limited and districts remain reasonably compact and are not drawn primarily on racial lines alone.
In this case, the Court ruled that Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black district was unconstitutional because race was found to be the predominant factor in drawing the district lines and overriding traditional redistricting principles such as compactness and respect for political boundaries. In turn, it also reshaped how states may consider race in drawing electoral maps.
James Finck is a professor of American history at the University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma. He can be reached at james.finck@swoknews.com. Thanks to the Southwest Ledger and the Lawton Constitution for sharing his column.
