Historically, the 1990s stand out as a fascinating decade, the one immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
For generations, political theorists had grown up in a world where “containment” defined foreign policy and shaped global strategy. With that structure suddenly gone, they were forced to make sense of an unfamiliar landscape. The result was a surge of new ideas and publications, as scholars and policymakers alike sought to articulate a new guiding framework for the modern world, something akin to a post–Cold War containment.
As someone who attended high school and college during the 1990s, I was immersed in these debates at the time. Now, sitting here 30-plus years later, it feels worthwhile to revisit some of the most influential theories from that era and consider how well they have held up. Two in particular stand out: “The End of History” by Francis Fukuyama and “The Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel P. Huntington. I’ll discuss the latter in a future article.
In 1989, Fukuyama first proposed what would become his most famous idea, later expanding it into his 1992 book “The End of History and the Last Man.” His central argument was that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked not just the end of the Cold War, but the culmination of humanity’s ideological evolution. He did not mean that major historical events would cease; rather, he argued that no fundamentally new political or economic system would emerge to surpass liberal democracy and capitalism.
Fukuyama framed this as a long progression of political development. Early human societies were organized around tribes and kinship groups. As populations expanded and became more complex, these gave way to monarchies and empires that exercised centralized, often absolute authority. The Enlightenment challenged these systems, and revolutions in America and France replaced them with governments grounded in the consent of the governed rather than divine right. Alongside these political changes came the rise of capitalism as a dominant economic model.
These liberal democracies were far from perfect. The Industrial Revolution produced immense inequality and hardship — tensions that ultimately contributed to the outbreak of World War I. These issues birthed competing ideologies, most notably, socialism, communism and fascism. Yet the march of time saw these competing ideologies fail. Absolute monarchies evolved into constitutional ones, fascism was defeated in World War II, and communism gradually collapsed under its own inability to deliver prosperity, freedom, and recognition on par with liberal democratic systems. As people living under communist regimes became increasingly aware of these shortcomings, support for those systems eroded.
In many ways, Fukuyama’s view resembles a kind of “survival of the fittest” applied to political systems. Different ways of organizing society compete, adapt, and fail, gradually converging on forms that better meet human needs and desires. In his view, liberal democracy emerged as the system that best satisfies those demands. This did not mean there would be no setbacks. Authoritarian governments could and would arise, but they ultimately would falter for similar reasons. No fundamentally new or superior system, he argued, would replace liberal democracy. Hence, the “end of history.”
Fukuyama also predicted that as more countries adopted liberal democratic systems, the frequency of large-scale warfare would decline. For a time, particularly in the decades immediately following the Cold War, this seemed largely accurate, with the notable exception of certain regional conflicts.
Looking back from 2026, aspects of Fukuyama’s thesis appear to have held up better than others. He was largely correct in predicting that no clearly superior alternative to liberal democracy has emerged. Even countries that remain authoritarian, such as China, incorporate significant elements of market-driven capitalism rather than adhering to traditional communist models. Similarly, nations often cited as social democracies, like Finland and Norway, have moved closer to capitalist market principles.
Where his argument appears weaker is in the persistence of authoritarian systems. Yet, Fukuyama has suggested that many such regimes, including Russia, feel compelled to maintain at least the appearance of democratic legitimacy to satisfy their populations. We are also seeing attacks against capitalism and even liberal democracy from within, as the failed equalizing promises of communism are becoming stylish again.
On the 25th anniversary of his original thesis, writing in The Wall Street Journal, Fukuyama reaffirmed his belief that liberal democracy remains the most viable system. However, he also acknowledged that it is far more fragile and reversible than he initially suggested. The primary threat, he argued, is no longer an external ideological rival, but internal dysfunction. In particular, he pointed to increasing political polarization, institutional gridlock, and the growing influence of powerful interest groups — especially in the United States — as factors that can undermine democratic governance.
In this revised view, liberal democracies are less likely to collapse because of external enemies and more likely to weaken from within, as their institutions become rigid, captured, and unable to adapt to changing circumstances.
James Finck is a professor of American history at the University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma. He can be reached at james.finck@swoknews.com. Thanks to the Southwest Ledger and the Lawton Constitution for sharing his column.
